THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY POST GENERAL ELECTION 2019

                                                                                                    THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY POST GENERAL ELECTION 2019

BANDIYAH

                                                   Department of Political Science FISIP UNUD

The simultaneous holding of elections in 2019 emphasized the complexity of elections in administrative practices. One of the reasons why simultaneous election results are the same as separate elections because the election design used does not undergo fundamental changes, especially in terms of the magnitude of the electoral district (district magnitude), the formula for converting votes into seats, because the application of sainted league (pure) basically works the same as the voter divider number (BPP) and the application of parliamentary thresholds is still less relevant. This emphasizes the assumption that simultaneity can drive changes in maps of political forces and simple parties which actually have no theoretical backing and are not supported by existing practices. Finally, the conclusions according to Nurhasim (2019) while the election simultaneously failed to implement procedural democracy as expected.

In addition to procedural democracy that is not met, in another democracy arena Herbert Kitschelt (1995) questions how the quality of democracy produced after simultaneous general elections. In the Kitschelt approach, the quality of post-election democracy is suspected in three aspects. The first is how the relationship between the political elite and the community or environmental sector can work well. The quality of democracy is determined when political elites are able to meet all the interests of the people implemented in government policy programs. Bali Province is an experience in the object of this study.

From various legislative informants explained that the whole legislative policy program mostly came from representative institutions (DPRD) namely input from the executive and a little from the initiative of the council. Executives are institutions that execute government programs and work with programs and budgets that have been planned in advance. To strengthen government programs sometimes requires a legal or regulatory umbrella that is proposed executive through legislative approval. This is what is considered by legislators as a function of legislation that is actually not the case. That reason also explains the very few initiatives of the council in submitting policy programs. Therefore the legislative political elite argued that the proposed policy program in the DPRD institution was part of the policies and interests of the people.

Having a legislative function, legislative members should have the task of making policy programs that are taken directly from the aspirations of the people or constituents and then articulated in a policy program within the DPR / DPRD institution, because the legislature is the representative of the people in parliament. In addition, the proposed policy program must be adjusted to the party program that was planned beforehand in the party's vision and mission and AD / RT. The problem now is that political parties do not have a clear party program. Most members of the legislature formally claim that the formulated policy program is in conformity with the party. This indicates that political parties do not have a programmatic party program measured in the Indonesian party system. While the policy program originating from the executive does not necessarily bring the interests of the people, because the agenda-setting in the formulation of the policy is always colored by the pressure of the interests of other political elites.

Thus, can the legislative political elite fulfill the interests of the people implemented in the policy program? Of course, the answer is not fulfilled, because the absence of the programmatic party and the policy program of the council's initiative indicates that the interests are only for the elite, let alone legislative checks and balances on the executive not working well. In the political stage, clientelism and regional broker collusion often occur in economic projects or others.

Second is competitiveness, namely whether political elites compete to bring their policy programs. Political elite competition usually arises because of opposition groups as government watchdogs. In legislative institutions, this opposition is very necessary to maintain democratic values. Building strong parliamentary consolidation requires healthy competition between the ruler (government) and the opposition. Apparently this did not happen in parliament in Indonesia, especially in the DPRD throughout the Bali region. Parties in the Bali region, for example, are mostly dominated by PDIP and other parties are just clients who do not have any power over patrons.

The institutional DPRD Bali that works collegially illustrates that competition does not occur when producing a policy. Proposed policy programs by any political party are considered by the council as a program owned by the people and other party factions usually approve the policy program when budget allocations are available, and even deadlocks rarely occur in formulating policies. The budget allocation for policy programs becomes very important to be approved by the legislature in parliament. Conversely, if a budget is not provided, it is difficult to submit it as a policy program. This was reported by almost all legislative informants interviewed. Thus the absence and limitations of the budget can hamper the process of policy formulation.

One example is the case of KIS (Kartu Indonesia Sehat) given by the state to poor people in Indonesia. When the KIS fund budget was terminated by the state budget, the Gianyar legislative council urged the Gianyar Regional Government to finance the KIS, which was not previously allocated at all by the Gianyar Regional Government. As an institution that has a budget function, the Gianyar DPRD has succeeded in influencing the Regent of Gianyar to issue Perbup on the sustainability of the KIS budget. The regent's regulations are then disseminated to villages in all districts of Gianyar. This is one illustration of the PDIP party competition as the party that has the most constituency base in Bali. While the collegial collective work system of legislators in the Bali region shows that there is no competitiveness among political parties. This is due to the presence of weak opposition because political parties tend to pursue pragmatic and materialist politics. If so, it can result in the collapse of the democratic system which is owned by the Indonesian people.

The third is coalition capacity, namely whether the legislative political elite has the ability to build coalitions or collectivities in translating people's wishes into policy products. Collective collegial work built by the legislature basically has an adverse effect on the quality of democracy because it is produced through pragmatic agreements, without any measurable collectivity efforts. While coalition capacity has a positive impact on the development of democracy because the cooperation or collectivity built by legislative members in parliament can be measured in quality and that is where the degree of democracy is produced as a form of struggle for the political elite in translating the interests of the people towards policy products. But all that depends on the capacity played by the political elite because it is often faced with political conspiracy and party clientelism that continues to occur.

From some of the exploratory findings described above, it provides an analysis that the DPRD in the Bali region is a small part of the regional legislative institutional experience that has not been established in actualizing Herbert Kitschelt's democratic values. This is because the three areas such as the linkage sector, competitiveness, and coalition capacity have not reached a balance with each other and are not maintaining each other. Of course, it can be seen from how the ability of the party's political elite in parliament can translate policies tailored to party programs. While in reality, political elites in parliament work based on proposed regulations that are sourced from executive initiatives with available budgets. While proposals from the initiative of the council that in fact party representatives who are able to represent party programs are still considered low. This proves that the legislative political elite has not made their party the main support in formulating policy programs in parliament. On the contrary, all policies carried out by the legislature in parliament are considered as synergy and in accordance with the party's program.

This is very different from the experience of parties in America where the ideology, platform, and vision and mission of the party is very clear, so it is also clear where the political party is going. On the contrary, the presence of extreme multiparty parties in Indonesia has shown no clear direction for the party's struggle, despite the party's ideology and vision and mission. On the other hand, it will be difficult for the president and the legislature to build a coalition because there is no community winning party below 22%. This condition makes it difficult to implement the value of democracy in sharing. According to Kitschelt, the possibility of this condition is caused by the management of political parties which is not optimal, because the political interactions carried out by party political elites tend to be pragmatic and materialist so that they come out of programmatic party goals. Therefore it is necessary to review related party systems and elections that are more easily presented. Complexity in electoral and party format has hampered the consolidation of democracy.

Indonesia's party and the electoral system was born from a rushed process, which led to "Democracy of the Criminals" (Juan J. Linz: 2001). The existence of parties that are too dominant, similar to the multi-party era in Indonesia. Apart from the existence of problematic party residues in the New Order Era. All that needs to be taken into account and reviewed on the party and electoral system so as not to harm democracy that can be repeated again. Kitschelt offers considerations that the historical conditions of the Indonesian people are important in making the election and party format. For example, when the patron-client system is still 'ingrained' in Indonesian society, it is necessary to make strong regulations and legal systems to dispel the patron culture, but still provide a space of expression for all sectors of the sector both political elites, the public, and the private sector so that the resulting policies the legislature is not constrained by the colonialist cultural heritage. In addition, the legal system must be intensive care that gives the interests of the elite to be accommodated and implemented well.

The problem is in Indonesia, the rule of law is an elite political product. Often in practice, establishing a legal system that is 'sharp up and blunt down'. In the end, this legal system only benefits the elite, while many lower classes do not get justice. A big task for the Indonesian people to break the patron-client chain and change the legal system that is fair to all elements of society. In the end, the general election is still parliamentary bias, because the presidential system failed to be implemented. The second is bias at the center because party decentralization does not occur well and programmatic parties also do not work.